Operation BOLO: A mission to maintain air superiority

  • Published
  • By Michael Stephen, 7th Air Force/8th Fighter Wing Historian

Much has already been written about Operation BOLO, one notable example being Historian Howard Halvorsen’s 2011 article. However, not much if at all has been provided from the perspective of Gen William W. Momyer, who was the Seventh Air Force commander in Vietnam at the time the mission was conducted on January 2, 1967.

Gen. Momyer’s views on the subject can be found in his 1978 book, Air Power in Three Wars. From the book you can glean what his motivations were going into the operation.

Gen. Momyer viewed Operation BOLO as a necessary and timely countermeasure to maintain air superiority in the region . He understood that the North Vietnamese Air Force’s (NVAF) newfound capabilities posed a significant risk to U.S. strike missions, particularly to the vulnerable F-105 Thunderchief.

The Thunderchiefs were bomb-laden aircraft participating in strike missions, escorted by F-4 fighter escorts also carrying bombs, that set forth against specific targets in North Vietnam. Momyer aimed to force the MiGs into an engagement under unfavorable conditions, exploiting their reliance on their Ground Control Interceptor (GCI) system and predictable attack patterns in Operation BOLO.

Though the MIG threat in Vietnam was relatively low in 1965 and the early part of 1966, the threat increased significantly in the later part of 1966 due to improved tactics by the NVAF. These tactics utilized by pilots of the MIG-21 were the greatest concern of 7th AF pilots throughout the war. Two reasons for that improvement.

First, the NVAF flying formations became more flexible as the North Vietnamese GCI system was further developed in the last three months of 1966. Secondly, the new Atoll heat-seeking missile allowed the NVAF to attack quicker and with less risk to themselves by utilizing high-speed hit-and-run tactics (maneuvers that progressed similarly by North Korean and Chinese pilots during the Korean War).

7th AF determined how an appropriately designed fighter sweep conducted at just the right time would destroy a large number of MIGs. “The fighter sweep was designed to appear as a normal F-105 strike force with escorting fighters,” said Momyer in his book.

The escorting fighters used typical call signs, and all indicators were designed to provide the notion that it was just another run-of-the-mill strike force. For Operation BOLO to succeed, the F-4s would be without bombs and the timing of the mission would take advantage of the Christmas and New Year standdown, which in the past, the MIGs had demonstrated a significant effort.

Operation BOLO succeeded in completely catching the MIG pilots by surprise. Although significant in its success, Momyer reflected on how the engagement was relatively small compared to larger air battles in conflicts like the Korean War.

Overall, Momyer depicted Operation BOLO as an effective use of deception and tactical planning to address emerging threats , mirroring the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concepts the Air Force is developing to counter today’s threats.